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Quantum key distribution with 
hacking countermeasures and long 
term ボeld trial
A. R. Dixon  の, J. F. Dynesは, M. Lucamariniは, B. Fröhlichは, A. W. Sharpe  は, A. Plewsは, W. Tamは, 
Z. L. Yuan  は, Y. Tanizawaの, H. Satoの, S. Kawamuraの, M. Fujiwaraば, M. Sasakiば & A. J. Shieldsは
Quantum key distributions (QKDs) central and unique claim is information theoretic security. However 
there is an increasing understanding that the security of a QKD system relies not only on theoretical 
security proofs, but also on how closely the physical system matches the theoretical models and 
prevents attacks due to discrepancies. These side channel or hacking attacks exploit physical devices 
which do not necessarily behave precisely as the theory expects. As such there is a need for QKD 
systems to be demonstrated to provide security both in the theoretical and physical implementation. 
We report here a QKD system designed with this goal in mind, providing a more resilient target against 
possible hacking attacks including Trojan horse, detector blinding, phase randomisation and photon 
number splitting attacks┻ The QKD system was installed into a ぱひ km link of a metropolitan telecom 
network for a は┻ひ month period┸ during which time the system operated continuously and distributed 
の┻ばば Tbits of secure key data with a stable secure key rate over はねね kbit【s┻ In addition security is 
demonstrated against coherent attacks that are more general than the collective class of attacks 
usually considered.
Quantum Key Distribution1 (QKD) is well known for its unique information theoretic security, which does not 
depend on the resources available to an eavesdropper. In recent years experiments have demonstrated high rates 
of key distribution2–4 combined with network architectures5, 6 and standard data signals via multiplexing7–10. 
Progress is also being made on long term operation, deployment in real telecom networks and linking together 
multiple diferent QKD systems11–14.
As the experimental maturity of QKD has advanced so too has the understanding of important diferences 
between the security assumptions of the theory and the physical implementation. These differences could 
potentially be exploited by an eavesdropper, allowing quantum hacking attacks which bypass the presumed 
quantum-enabled security. An early example of this was seen in the irst QKD experiment15, when the audible 
movement of components leaked key information to anyone within hearing distance16. his constitutes a clear 
example of a “side channel” – a physical channel that is informative to the eavesdropper but is not included in 
the theoretical model. he presence of side channels is a problem facing all cryptographic devices. Classical cryp-
tography hardware implementations have been demonstrated to be vulnerable to hacking targeting unexpected 
physical channels such as power usage17 or computation time18 instead of attacking the underlying mathematical 
algorithms.
In QKD, a number of diferent attacks have been proposed which exploit side channels in various diferent 
protocols. For the one way BB84 protocol the main examples of these attacks, and some typical countermeasures, 
are listed in Table 1. For other protocols see Table 1 in ref. 19. Countermeasures should ideally be connected to the 
system security proof via testable assumptions – this is done for example with decoy states, phase randomisation 
characterisation and also recently for Trojan horse optical components20, 21.
Some of these attacks are well-known; for example the photon number splitting attack (which can be mitigated 
using the decoy state protocol) and detector control attacks22–25. Many of these attacks have also been demon-
strated experimentally26–30. However, it is worth clarifying that reports of attacks breaking the security of QKD 
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invariably refer to breaking a particular protocol and hardware implementation rather than breaking QKD in 
general. And it also should be said that attacks are typically not implementable in real world conditions, requiring 
theoretical technology or access to characterise the particular QKD units under attack. Nevertheless for robust 
security guarantees all information which can leak through side channel attacks for a given implementation 
should be bounded and removed through privacy ampliication.
One possible way to remove side-channel information is to reduce the theory assumptions on a QKD imple-
mentation. his is exempliied in Device Independent (DI) QKD, which can provide an information theoretic 
secure key even if the physical quantum devices used in the protocol are not trusted to behave as expected31, 32. 
While progress in the theory has been underway, laboratory experimental demonstrations remain a challenge 
due to amongst other things the requirement for a loophole free Bell test. Even with experimental progress the 
secret key rate is anticipated to be extremely low, on the order of 10−10 bits per pulse, and only possible over very 
limited distance33, 34.
A more feasible proposal is Measurement Device Independent (MDI) QKD35, 36, where the detector units 
are untrusted but the transmitters must be trusted as in standard QKD. MDI-QKD can remove all of the detec-
tor based side-channel attacks but still remains vulnerable to source based attacks. It has been experimentally 
demonstrated in several recent papers37–40, including outside of the laboratory in a ield trial environment41, 42. 
However there remain challenges, including the di culty of synchronising and interfering two phase randomised 
independent sources separated by large distances, especially at the clock rates used by modern conventional 
QKD systems. his typically limits the secure key rate to values much lower than conventional QKD in practical 
scenarios, despite a recent laboratory proof of principle demonstration of high bit rate MDI-QKD43. Additionally 
MDI-QKD uses a three party coniguration, which is not as straightforward to integrate into existing communi-
cation infrastructure.
Here we focus on providing security against side-channel attacks for conventional QKD, which can work 
reliably at high key rates alongside existing telecom infrastructure. It is also worth noting security techniques 
developed for this purpose are also applicable for the transmitter units (Alice and Bob) in MDI-QKD systems, 
which use a similar architecture and are vulnerable to source side channel attacks. Eforts are currently under-
way towards the standardisation of QKD44, 45, including implementation security and countermeasures against 
side-channel attacks. As such we aim to develop possible solutions towards the goal of future implementation 
standards, which are urgently needed to allow for robust testing and certiication of security.
In the following section we report a QKD system which has been designed to this end, to provide not only 
theoretical but also practically implemented security. he section following this reports the system’s installation 
in a telecom ibre network for ield testing, and the performance of a newly developed security proof providing 
security against more general attacks than usually considered. he Methods section provides additional details 
about the QKD system hardware, stabilisation, security countermeasures and post processing.
QKD System
he prototype QKD system consists of rack mount server sized (19 inch wide and 3U high) units, as shown in 
Fig. 1. One unit is the transmitter (“Alice”), and the second unit a receiver (“Bob”). he system is based around the 
well-known decoy state BB84 protocol and uses phase encoded optical pulses with sub single photon intensities to 
transmit the quantum information. he QKD system implements an automated initialisation and alignment rou-
tine which enables key distribution to begin operating within several minutes of a cold start, with no user input or 
adjustment required. he system additionally implements component monitoring for both security and reliabil-
ity, as well as reined stabilisation subsystems to provide consistent operation under harsh operating conditions 
such as those experienced during transmission through aerial ibre cables. A web browser based graphical user 
interface is also implemented to allow for user friendly control and monitoring of the system and all security and 
component subsystems. Figure 2 shows an outline schematic of the major components in the QKD transmitter 
and receiver, with further details on the standard QKD components provided in the Methods section and ref. 46, 
and the implementation security features discussed in the following section.
Implementation Security┻ As shown in Table 1, there are three typical source side channel attacks for this 
type of QKD system. Photon number splitting attacks can be well controlled using decoy states, and 3 intensities 
levels (signal µ ≈ 0.4, decoy µ ≈ 0.1 and vacuum µ ≈ 0.0007 photons/pulse) are implemented in the system for this 
purpose – see the Methods section for further details. Phase randomisation of subsequent pulses without the need 
for additional active components from the particular laser source used in the transmitter has been tested47–49, 
thus mitigating this side channel. An alternative approach would be using a small number of discrete random 
Attack name Target Countermeasures
Photon number splitting65 Source Decoy states56, 57, SARG0466
Trojan horse52, 67 Source/Receiver Passive optical components20, 52
Phase randomisation68 Source Active randomisation69, Characterisation47
Blinding22 Detector
MDI-QKD35, 36, Optical monitoring28, 
Detector monitoring70
Time shit24, 29, 71 Detector MDI-QKD35, 36, Detector symmetrisation72
Dead-time73 Detector MDI-QKD35, 36, Simultaneous dead-time74
Table 1. Examples of side channel attacks on one way BB84 QKD.
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phases to guarantee security50. In this case, however, an additional source of random numbers is needed and the 
approach has only been demonstrated in the ininite-key limit to date. he laser diode temperature and output 
power is continuously monitored to ensure it is in the correct operating regime for phase randomisation and for 
QKD, and the system output power is constantly monitored and kept stable using an automated variable optical 
attenuator. If any anomalies in these quantities are detected QKD is suspended and an alert displayed in the user 
interface sotware.
he remaining main source based attack is the Trojan horse (also called large pulse) attack. In this attack an 
adversary directs intense light into a QKD system and measures the relected light in order to gain information 
about the state of the components inside the system, which can leak information on the key. he system’s vulner-
ability to this type of attack has been analysed and quantiied, with full details in ref. 20. his analysis principally 
considers attacks on the phase modulator, but it has recently been extended to also cover intensity modulator 
attacks by Tamaki et al.21. hese type of attacks can oten be more dangerous, but with the conservative choice of 
countermeasure components (discussed in the following paragraph and the Methods section) the system satisies 
the security requirements for both phase modulator and intensity modulator. he analysis is based on character-
ising the relectivity of components inside the transmitter (typically around 40 dB) and the maximum amount of 
input light possible before destructive ibre damage occurs (typically around 5 W). Based on these values a bound 
can be placed on the maximum amount of relected light it is possible for a malicious eavesdropper to collect, 
and this can then be used to bound the information gain possible through the attack. his information gain is 
incorporated into the secure rate calculation, and privacy ampliication used to remove it as normal for leaked 
information.
Additional optical components can be added to the transmitter to reduce the amount of relected light, and 
reduce the information gain and required extra privacy ampliication to an arbitrarily small amount. hese opti-
cal components are show in Fig. 2: Attenuators (A), which provide equal attenuation in both directions of light 
travel; isolators (I), which attenuate strongly in only one direction; and narrow band pass wavelength ilters (F), 
which provide strong attenuation outside a small wavelength window. he use of wavelength ilters is important 
to prevent attacks exploiting possibly increased relectivity of components and decreased attenuation outside of 
the usual 1550 nm operating wavelength of the system51. Further details on these components is provided in the 
Methods section.
he receiver unit is protected from Trojan horse attacks against the phase modulator through the use of an 
appropriate optical delay line (DL in Fig. 2) combined with the GHz modulation clock rate. Due to the photons 
Figure 1. Photograph of the QKD system transmitter and receiver. he units are 19 inch rack sized (3 U high).
Figure 2. Schematic diagram of main components of the QKD system, showing the transmitter (Alice) and 
receiver (Bob). LD: Laser diode, IM: Intensity modulator, BS: Beam splitter, PBS: Polarising beam splitter, 
A: Variable optical attenuator, I: Optical isolator, F: Narrow band pass optical ilter, DL: Delay line, MD: 
Monitoring detector, EPC: Electronic polarisation controller, FS: Fibre stretcher, APD: Avalanche photodiode 
detector, SD: self-diferencing circuit.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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travel time through the delay line and the basis modulator switching time this makes it impossible for Eve to 
receive any back relected light from the phase modulator before the modulated photon has been detected by 
Bob52. he only information Eve can gain from Bob’s modulator is on the basis measured, and this information is 
of no use ater the detection has taken place (at which points the basis is publically revealed).
To provide a basic guard against potential APD blinding attacks the input optical power is monitored at the 
receiver as shown in Fig. 2, with a beam splitter (BS) and optical power monitor (MD) located directly ater the 
receiver’s input port from the transmission ibre. Approximately 99% of the input is directed to Bob’s interfer-
ometer as usual, with 1% directed to the optical power monitor. In addition the APD module’s temperature is 
continuously monitored for any anomalies, which will further constrain possible hacking attacks22. Any out of 
range discrepancies in light input or temperature cause QKD to be suspended and an alarm to be raised in the 
user interface. hese countermeasures restrict the range of feasible blinding attacks, but a tight connection with 
a security proof and testable assumptions is still lacking. herefore, they cannot be considered a complete solu-
tion. For instance the presented technique has limitations due to the low response of the monitoring detector to 
ultra-narrow optical pulses.
Active Stabilisation. Due to luctuations in environmental conditions afecting both the transmission ibre 
and the QKD units there are several time varying noise sources which afect the system; these must be continu-
ously compensated for to maintain stable key distribution operation – details of these stabilisation systems are 
provided in the Methods section.
During ield trials, and in practical use cases, the transmitter and receiver QKD units will be placed in separate 
and remote locations and will operate over ibres which may be exposed to uncontrollable environmental per-
turbations. To enable the system to operate at high key rates within these potentially rapidly changing conditions 
more specialised stabilisation algorithms have been developed. he algorithm employed is based on Proportional 
Integral Diferential (PID) control, and provides an output signal inluenced by both the current and feedback 
signal history and its expected value. his algorithm is used both for stabilising the interferometer and the polar-
isation drit in the ibre.
A comparison between the newly developed specialised algorithm and a simpler ixed rate algorithm (used for 
example in the QKD system described in ref. 46) is shown in Fig. 3. As can be seen from the igure the variation 
in QBER is much reduced with the PID based algorithms.
Results
he QKD system described in the previous section was installed into a metropolitan area ibre telecom network53 
as shown in Fig. 4. A ibre optic cable of 45 km length connects an oice building in central Tokyo to a location 
in the western suburbs of the city. he transmitter is installed in a server rack at the central location and con-
nected to the receiver in the western location by two ibres from the cable; one is used for quantum signals and 
the second for all other communication data, such that no external network connection is required for the QKD 
system to operate. he ibre is of standard SMF-28 type with a total characterised loss of 14.5 dB, equivalent to 
0.33 dB/km – this is increased compared to the typical laboratory ibre loss of 0.2 dB/km mainly due to splice 
and other connector losses. Approximately half of the ibre is located in underground ducts and half suspended 
above ground on aerial poles. Aerial ibre is in general much more exposed to environmental changes such as 
temperature and wind induced movement, which can afect the transmission characteristics (for example transit 
time and birefringence).
Following installation the system operated continuously for several extended periods of time, during which 
the system was entirely automated with no user control or adjustments made to the system. Results from a typical 
77 days of continuous operation are shown in Fig. 5 (the ield trial continuous operation duration was limited by 
Figure 3. Histogram of QBER variation from the mean over time, using the newly developed PID based 
stabilisation algorithm (lower) as compared to the previous simple algorithm (top).
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external factors such as transmission ibre maintenance or power outages, with uninterrupted ibre access longer 
term continuous operation would be possible).
Following the extended ield trial reported in the previous section the system was upgraded to use a newly 
developed version of the security proof which provides security against more general attacks54. Results from 
operation over the same 45 km of installed ibre are shown in Fig. 6, which to our knowledge is the irst QKD ield 
trial guaranteeing theoretical security against a class of attacks wider than collective attacks, including inite-key 
size efects and decoy states.
Discussion
he system performance, deployed over the 45 km installed ibre, is shown in Fig. 5 over a period of 2.5 months 
(the operation time limited by external power supply and transmission ibre maintenance). he sited key rate 
(94% of the raw rate) averaged 1.11 Mbit/s and QBER 3.47%. Both remained stable over the period with ≈5% 
standard deviation, due to newly developed active stabilisation feedback subsystems able to cope with variable 
weather conditions. During this time the secure key rate averaged 210 kbit/s and in total 1.33 terabits of secure key 
data was distributed. Despite several security enhancements to the current system the secure key rate is similar to 
the rate during a shorter ield trial of a previous system46 while the variation of all parameters is reduced, mainly 
due to the improved stabilisation systems. he secure key rate is calculated with composable security (failure 
Figure 4. Location of the ield trial of the QKD system, with the transmitter sited in central Tokyo and the 
receiver towards the western edge of the city. he two locations are connected by an installed telecom ibre pair 
with a length of 45 km and loss of 14.5 dB. Map data courtesy of: Google Earth, SIO, NOAA, U.S. Navy, NGA, 
GEBCO, Image Landsat and Japan Hydrographic Association.
Figure 5. Field trial performance of the QKD system installed in a 45 km telecom ibre link over a 77 day 
period, with collective attack security. From upper to lower the secure key rate, sited key rate and QBER are 
shown along with their mean value (µ) and standard deviation (σ).
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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probability ε = 10−10) against collective attacks55 on inite key block sizes (50 Mbit), with error correction and 
privacy ampliication performed on this block in real time – further details are described in the Methods section.
he system additionally implemented a newly developed security proof, aimed at covering a more general 
class of theoretical attacks, and with this over a 24 hour ield trial period averaged a secure key rate of 131 kbit/s 
(Fig. 6). he key rate is reduced compared to collective attacks only (Fig. 5), despite the QBER being approx-
imately the same. his reduction is partially due to the more general attacks considered and partially to the 
reduced sited key rate, caused by the optimal value of the majority basis fraction (the photons used for the inal 
key) being smaller for the general attacks case.
We have reported the development and ield trial performance of a high speed QKD system. he system imple-
ments security countermeasures to prevent against side-channel hacking attacks, in particular against Trojan horse 
attacks, as well as phase randomisation, photon number splitting and detector blinding attacks. Additionally com-
ponents of the system including the laser diode and APDs are monitored continuously. We believe that testable 
implementation security countermeasures in conjunction with privacy ampliication will be a useful tool for future 
QKD systems (including MDI QKD which requires countermeasures for the Alice and Bob units), and will help 
QKD to maintain robust security guarantees even in the presence of non-ideal realistic components.
Methods
QKD System details. he system is based around FPGAs and integrated electronics. It operates at a 1 GHz 
transmission clock rate, with a 1550 nm distributed feedback laser (LD) in the transmitter unit producing pho-
ton pulses which are subsequently attenuated to contain approximately 0.4 photons per pulse on average. Decoy 
states56, 57 are implemented using an intensity modulator (IM) to allow for a high secure key rate secure against 
possible photon number splitting attacks, with ~1% of pulses transmitted with a reduced photon lux of 0.1 pho-
tons per pulse and <1% as a vacuum pulse containing 0.0007 photons per pulse. he intensity in the vacuum 
pulses is limited by the extinction ratio of the intensity modulator used for the state preparation.
All photon states pass through an asymmetrical Mach-Zehnder interferometer in the transmitter, one arm of 
which contains a phase modulator (PM) to encode four discrete phase values (2 basis each with 2 states) onto the 
photon pulse. Asymmetrical, or eicient, BB84 basis selection probabilities58 are used to increase the secure key rate, 
with the majority basis selected with 97% probability at both the transmitter and receiver. he decoy fractions, pho-
ton luxes, and basis probabilities are all optimised through simulation to produce optimally high secure key rates. A 
ibre Bragg grating is also employed to reduce the efects of chromatic dispersion during transmission as the system 
is designed to be used over standard telecom ibre where chromatic dispersion can cause QBER degradation59.
A matched Mach-Zehnder interferometer in the receiver decodes the photon’s phase into output detector path 
information, using a phase modulator (PM) in one arm for active QKD basis selection. he interferometer pair is 
constructed using polarisation dependent beam splitters (PBS), to ensure photons travel through opposite paths 
in the interferometer pair (long-short or short-long) and thus always arrive at the inal beam splitter coincidently. 
An electronic polarisation controller (EPC) is placed before the interferometer to compensate polarisation rota-
tions in the transmission ibre, and an electrically driven ibre stretcher (FS) in one arm of the interferometer 
compensates path length changes.
Following the interferometer, single photon detection is performed using self diferenced60 InGaAs avalanche 
photodiodes (APDs) thermoelectrically cooled to −30 °C. he self diferencing (SD) circuit allows the APDs to 
be gated in Geiger mode at 1 GHz without the excessive noise which would normally result at such gating rates. 
he detectors operate at an eiciency of 20% with a 4% aterpulse probability and 2 × 10−5 dark counts per gate.
Trojan horse components. Figure 7 shows typical optical properties of two of these components, an iso-
lator in (a) and wavelength ilter in (b). he isolators used typically provide in excess of 60 dB of attenuation in 
one direction and less than 0.6 dB in the reverse case. he wavelength ilter provides close to no loss at its central 
wavelength and approximately 80 dB of loss outside of this. By combining a small number of optical components 
Figure 6. Field trial performance of the QKD system installed in a 45 km telecom ibre link, with general attack 
security. From upper to lower the secure key rate, sited key rate and QBER are shown along with their mean 
value.
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– a 40 dB attenuator, 60 dB isolator and wavelength ilter – suicient total round trip attenuation can be achieved 
(on the order of 200 dB including component relectivity) to make the possible information leakage from Trojan 
horse attacks negligible21.
Stabilisation systems. here are three main stabilisation systems which operate continuously to maintain 
the raw key rate and QBER at their optimum values.
Firstly the path length of the ibre optic based interferometers in the transmitter and receiver change with 
temperature, and so to compensate for this change and maintain identical path lengths as required an electrically 
driven ibre length stretching component is placed in the receiver’s interferometer. his component is driven con-
tinuously based on a feedback signal provided by higher intensity optical stabilisation pulses which are sent in a 
known phase state and randomly replace quantum pulses a small fraction of the time.
he second main stabilisation subsystem is required to compensate the polarisation rotation which occurs to 
photons during travel through the transmission ibre. While the quantum information is encoded on the photon’s 
phase, polarisation is used to increase the eiciency of the interferometer pair by avoiding paths where photons 
travel through both long arms or both short arms of the interferometers (these cases would not interfere and fall 
outside of the detector gate period, reducing the detected photon count rate). As the transmission ibre is subject 
to environmental movement and expansion the birefringence changes and so the output polarisation rotates con-
stantly, and to compensate for this an electronic polarisation controller (EPC) is employed before the interferome-
ter in the receiver. his EPC is driven continuously based on a feedback signal provided by the detectors’ count rate.
he third main stabilisation subsystem is related to the photon travel time variation during transmission 
through the fibre, caused primarily by fibre expansion and contraction due to environmental temperature 
changes. Based on the detected photon count rate the clock delay in the receiver is adjusted so that the photon 
arrival time always matches the centre of the detectors’ gate period and the centre of the phase modulator period.
QKD Post-processing. he secure key is produced from a inite sized raw key, and as such all estimated 
quantities used in the secure key size calculation are subject to statistical bounds. In order to obtain the highest 
secure key rate tight bounds are required, and this requires larger raw key block sizes to be used during the post 
processing phase, in particular for privacy ampliication. Privacy ampliication using the simple matrix multipli-
cation approach traditionally employed scales as N2 in computational complexity with increasing block size N. 
As such it becomes infeasible to use with the large block sizes required for high key rates. Instead we implement 
a number theoretic transform based algorithm which scales almost linearly (N log (N)) with block size61. his 
enables block sizes of greater than 50 Mbit to be privacy ampliied in real time even at Mbit/s key rates.
Error correction is implemented using the Cascade algorithm62, with typical error correction eiciencies of 
around 15% above the theoretical minimum (f = 1.15). While LDPC based error correction63 has also been inves-
tigated64 and found to have a somewhat improved eiciency (f ≈ 1.10), in practice the overall increase in secure 
key rate has been found to be small (on the order of 1%) once increased block failure rates are taken into account. 
Cascade (or LDPC) based error correction runs in real time at the Mbit/s raw key rates generated by the system.
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